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Establishing Research Legitimacy in the Contested Political Ground of 
Contemporary Northern Ireland 
 
 
Abstract: 
Despite the plethora of literature on the macro politics of Northern Ireland, there is a 
dearth of material on grassroots activity, in particular the dynamic between 
communities and paramilitary groups which enforce ‘law and order’ in working class 
areas. Political progress in the form of the Belfast Agreement (1998) has 
overshadowed the ongoing level of violence at the micro level and the voice of 
victims remains unheard in the search to attain a greater goal – a long-term political 
and constitutional settlement. This paper examines the methodological difficulties in 
establishing research legitimacy in the contested political arenas of Northern Ireland. 
It considers issues of access, establishing the researchers’ bona fides, openness and 
transparency, language and personal security, and offers some insights into research in 
sensitive topics. 
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Introduction 
The euphoria unleashed by the signing of the Belfast Agreement and the endorsement 
by its signatories of their ‘total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic 
and peaceful means of resolving differences’ (Belfast Agreement section 4:1, 1998), 
created the impression that violence had been eschewed in Northern Ireland. Over two 
years later the evidence suggests that this is far from true. It is the case that the worst 
manifestations of the conflict, sectarian killings and bombings, are declining. In 1999, 
for example, seven civilians were murdered, the lowest figure since the ‘troubles’ 
began, and the first year ever that there were no security force fatalities (Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) statistics: Northern Ireland Office, 2000).  This, however, 
ignores an insidious and ongoing level of paramilitary violence inflicted on working-
class communities referred to as ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings or the informal 
criminal justice system. Paramilitary groups see themselves as community protectors, 
their actions aimed ostensibly at maintaining ‘law and order’ through tackling petty 
crime such as car theft, joyriding, burglary and drug-dealing. Up to the end of 1999 
police statistics show that there have been 2,241 shootings (an average of 83 per year) 
and 1,560 beatings (an average of 87 per year) since 1973 and 1982 respectively, 
when figures were first recorded
1
. These statistics however are thought to grossly 
under-estimate the true extent of the problem. Those subjected to beatings and 
shootings are fearful of involving the security forces in case of paramilitary reprisal 
and hence there is large scale under reporting 
  
Paramilitary perpetrators exact community ‘justice’ using pick-axe handles, hockey 
and hurley sticks, baseball bats, steel rods and hammers. Other forms of ‘punishment’ 
include dropping heavy concrete blocks on limbs and using power tools on bones. 
                                                          
1
 The figures show that loyalists were responsible for 42% of the shootings and 45% of the beatings, 
republicans carried out the remainder. 
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Surgeons in the fracture clinic at the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast, for example, 
report that ‘following the cessation of violence there has been an increase in the level 
of injuries occurring in those undergoing paramilitary punishment’ (our emphasis) 
(Nolan et al, 1999). Their study of treating victims showed that those who had been 
shot with pistols, resulting in open injuries, suffered much less damage to soft tissue 
and bones than those who had been beaten. The brutal reality is that is ‘better’ to be 
shot than beaten. 
 
Three principal reasons are advanced for the existence of the informal criminal justice 
system. First, particularly in republican areas, there is an absence of an adequate 
policing service. The RUC has no legitimacy amongst republicans, and their 
communities would not normally involve the police in dealing with crimes in their 
areas. Republicans claim that the RUC are prepared to tolerate at best, or encourage at 
worst, crime in their communities as a way of undermining the ‘republican struggle’. 
Police are therefore willing to ‘trade’ dropping charges of joy riding, drug dealing, 
burglary etc. in return for low-level intelligence gathering on known republicans. In 
loyalist areas, objections to involving the police are more to do with keeping the RUC 
out of communities where drug dealing, racketeering and illegal drinking dens and 
clubs are commonplace. Second, there is a rising level of ‘anti-social behaviour’ and 
petty crime, particularly in working class areas. This is evidenced in crime and 
victimisation statistics, which show that those from an unskilled social class 
background are most vulnerable and feel their quality of life is particularly affected by 
fear of crime (Northern Ireland Office, 2000). A Police Authority (PANI) report 
which monitored the performance of the RUC during 1998/99 found ‘many categories 
of crime are on the increase while police performance in tackling this has not always 
been as effective as anticipated’ (PANI, 1999:9). In the absence, therefore, of a 
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legitimate police force and/or because people are discouraged from seeking RUC 
involvement, communities turn to paramilitaries to secure a prompt, visible and 
effective response to crime in their areas. Hence, local people living in fear of crime 
endorse paramilitary ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings. Third, the formal criminal 
justice system within these communities is perceived as slow, ineffectual, and soft on 
crime. In a society where violent conflict has been the norm for over 30 years, it isn’t 
surprising that the time taken to process offenders, the necessary safeguards in the 
legal system, and the standard of proof required for conviction is seen as no match for 
summary justice meted out by paramilitaries.  
 
Researching paramilitary violence 
Northern Ireland is replete with literature on political violence which concentrates on 
two broad areas – firstly, trying to establish the facts or data about the levels, 
distribution and sources of violence (Murray, 1982; Poole, 1993, Sutton, 1994; Fay, 
Morrissey and Smyth, 1999) and secondly, examining the causes of, or motivation 
for, violence (White, 1993; O’Duffy, 1995; Sullivan, 1998). What is largely absent, 
however, is research on the nature of the relationship between paramilitary groups and 
the communities over which they exert social control. There are, however, notable 
exceptions. Cavanaugh (1997) in an ethnographic study undertaken in loyalist and 
republican communities in Belfast posited the community, not as a passive entity, but 
integral to the analysis of political violence in Northern Ireland.  As part of that 
analysis she suggested civil society in Northern Ireland was characterised by a strong 
sense of community, ethnic separatism, and a tradition of loyalism and republicanism 
in both its cultural and political forms. ‘With basic security needs left unfulfilled and 
fear of identity loss prevalent in both republican and loyalists communities, strong 
intra-communal infrastructures have evolved which protect and promote community 
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cohesion’ (Cavanaugh, 1997: 46). This strong communal cohesion, she argued, 
demands social order and control constructed through ‘alternative legalities to that of 
the state’. She concluded: 
 Paramilitary involvement in social control is tolerated, even demanded, but 
communal support is conditional...For both loyalist and republican 
paramilitaries to maintain credibility they must meet communal demands to 
control hooding, drugs and petty crime. Administering ‘rough justice’ 
however, risks alienating or reducing the paramilitant’s support base...These 
findings illustrate the complexity of the relationship between paramilitant and 
community (Cavanaugh, 1997: 49). 
Cavanaugh concurred with research undertaken by Burton (1978) which suggested 
that paramilitaries and their communities had a ‘see-saw’ relationship, and to describe 
it as one forged through ‘naked force’ was too simplistic. Silke’s work (1998) is more 
detailed both on the range of methods used by paramilitary vigilantes and their 
motives. He argued that their activities revolved ‘around a practical need to control 
criminal behaviour as perceived by the community, and to control behaviour within 
that community which may threaten the authority of the paramilitaries’ (Silke, 
1998:151). Drawing on previous work by Hillyard (1985) and Sluka (1989), he 
distinguished between these two categories as ‘punishable’ offences - community or 
civil crime (theft, drug-dealing, joy-riding, vandalism, muggings etc.), and political 
crime (public criticism of the paramilitaries, collaboration with the security forces 
etc.). He added that maintaining alienation between the community and security 
forces was also an important function of vigilante activity. Silke (1999) further 
explored the problems which vigilantism raised for Sinn Féin as a political party and 
argued that ‘if they step away from ‘community policing’ they risk losing much of the 
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political support they currently enjoy’. If, however, they do not step away from it he 
suggested ‘they stifle the possibility of genuine growth’ (Silke, 1999: 89). 
The complexities of the community-paramilitary relationship are also obvious from a 
study by Brewer et al (1998) which looked at the role played by local communities in 
civil unrest and crime management. The researchers challenged some preconceptions 
about informal policing by paramilitaries as a means of social control in a study of 
two areas in Belfast. Therein, they found localised evidence of the extended family 
network, a sense of neighbourliness and community identity ‘which extends beyond 
the policing role of the paramilitary organisations’. In fact, they argued the role which 
paramilitaries play in local crime management ‘is heavily conditional upon the 
survival of community structures’ (Brewer et al, 1998: 576 & 581). 
 
Notwithstanding these notable contributions, the literature indicates a dearth of 
material on the role that communities play in our understanding of political violence 
in Northern Ireland and a lack of knowledge about the dynamic between them and the 
paramilitaries. Kennedy (1995), for example, points out that although the ‘brute facts 
of communal violence are well known...what is less well known is the degree of 
‘internal’ paramilitary repression (in the form of beatings, shootings and mutilations) 
which developed in the shadows of the larger conflict’ (Kennedy, 1995: 67).  
 
This prompted the research upon which this paper is based. Our discussions centre on 
methodological issues associated with conducing qualitative research involving, inter 
alia, victims of ‘punishment’ beatings (n = 40) and focus group work within 
communities (n = 4)  ‘controlled’ by the paramilitaries. Although the issues dealt with 
are personal reflections on researching paramilitary violence they may have wider 
implications for those undertaking ‘sensitive fieldwork’ elsewhere. We are mindful of 
  
 
9 
Brewer’s conclusions on police research in Northern Ireland, that sensitivity is highly 
situational and researchers need to consider ‘what they believe to be controversial and 
sensitive but also what their respondents, potential gatekeepers, and the community at 
large might consider to be sensitive about the research’ (Brewer, 1993:143). 
Similarly, Alty and Rodham (1998) suggest that research within sensitive areas 
requires flexibility and demands practical solutions that are not always linked to 
ethical dilemmas. We consider these issues under five key headings: access to victims 
of punishment beatings, establishing our bona fides, openness and transparency, 
nomenclature, and personal security. 
 
Accessing victims 
One of the most obvious methodological problems is securing access to those who 
have been subjected to paramilitary beatings. Making contact with community 
organisations with whom the researchers had previous experience seemed an useful 
starting point for the research. Whilst community workers were aware of a number of 
victims, their role in brokering contact met with limited success. What became clear 
was that the same community organisations had been the target for complaints about 
those involved in anti-social behaviour and onward referral of these complaints to 
paramilitaries. It should not have been too surprising therefore that ‘punishment’ 
victims felt unwilling to co-operate for research purposes with community 
organisations they suspected of ‘running to paramilitaries’ about them. This was not 
wholly unproductive and gave us access to interviews with, for example, a father and 
son who had been beaten in a mistaken identity case and community 
volunteers/workers who had themselves been beaten or shot. 
 
A typical account given by a victim illustrates the sensitivity of the topic: 
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 The paramilitaries put a bag over my head and bundled me into a black taxi. 
As they were driving me I started to cry and they told me to ‘fuck up, we just 
want to have a word with you about hooding’. When they stopped they threw 
me face-down on the ground and told me to shut my eyes tight. They took the 
bag off my head and told me to put my hands by my side. They grabbed my 
ankles and I heard a click and a bang and my leg just heated up – it was like a 
hot poker going through your leg. I started to scream. They were going to hit 
me a boot in the head, they told me to fuck up and then they shot me in the 
other leg. Then I started to scream more. I looked up shortly afterwards and 
there was nobody about. I was lying there screaming and shouting ‘help, help, 
I’ve been shot, I need an ambulance’ and a woman came out of her back 
garden and seen me lying there. Then I felt a wee bit faint. I wet myself as 
well. I asked for a glass of water but nobody would give me one because all 
the dirt was in my throat. The next minute my legs were being strapped and I 
was screaming more because I didn’t want to be touched. 
 In the hospital they gave me morphine to knock me out. The next day the 
doctor said to me, ‘the good news is that you are going to walk again’, The 
bad news is that there’s a bullet in your right leg and we can’t get it out. It’s 
lodged there and if we try to get it out we’re going to hit an artery and we 
won’t be able to stop the bleeding’. My nerves have just been shattered from 
it. I have nightmares every night. If I’m sitting in a room and see a couple of 
fellas staring at me, my hands sweat because I think they’re in the 
paramilitaries, and I get paranoid.  
(Interview with victim of ‘punishment’ shooting, December 1999). 
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When access was proving particularly difficult and slow, however, one suggestion 
was to visit victims admitted to hospital for injuries resulting from paramilitary 
attacks, the researcher’s equivalent of ambulance chasing. Media coverage of these 
incidents often carried footage of victims in hospital beds. Whilst this had the clear 
potential to raise awareness of the horrific nature of these incidents on a scale beyond 
the capacity of our research, there was also the danger of sensationalism. Our own 
predisposition was therefore to reject this possibility for access on the grounds that it 
could exacerbate the victim’s distress, recounting the incident so soon after the event 
and we suspected payments were made for the interviews which may have influenced 
the motivations of the respondents
2
.  
 
The most productive source of access, however, proved to be via the Probation Board 
for Northern Ireland, an executive non-departmental public body whose aim is to help 
prevent re-offending. Their day-to-day business brought them into contact with young 
people, a number of whom had been ‘disciplined’ by the paramilitaries for ‘anti-social 
behaviour’. Support for the research was secured at the senior level of the 
organisation and a letter of endorsement sent to area probation managers. Thereafter, 
the researchers made contact with local probation officers for referrals. Their 
professional interest in the topic and access to a ‘captive’ client base proved fruitful. 
A number of probation officers had to deal with the consequences of paramilitary 
violence for young people and were keen to assist with research which could help to 
address its causes. Their brokerage role also carried certain credibility and cultivated 
trust with those willing to be interviewed which would have been difficult for us as 
researchers ex ante to secure. 
 
                                                          
2
 We deliberated over payments-for-access in our  project and decided to reimburse interviewees at a 
standard rate for expenses incurred in  attending (e.g. travel costs, child minding fees, lost earnings). 
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Establishing our bona fides 
Beyond access, the first requirement for researchers in undertaking fieldwork of this 
nature is to establish their bona fides within the constituency. A key component of this 
is the need to demonstrate objectivity in one’s approach to the study. There is deep-
rooted hostility between the republican and loyalist paramilitaries and we, as 
researchers, had to be aware of not being seen to favour one constituency at the 
expense of the other. There was immediate suspicion about the ulterior motives of this 
research which had the potential to block access at worst or severely curtail data 
gathering. Three tactics were useful in addressing this issue.  
Firstly, it was crucially important to obtain ‘approval’ from key stakeholders. It is 
widely accepted in Northern Ireland that certain political parties have a direct line into 
the paramilitaries despite official denials or obfuscation about the nature of the 
relationship. Undertaking the research therefore required the imprimatur of 
paramilitaries or, at the very least, making them aware that fieldwork of this nature 
was being undertaken and its purpose. Apart from issues of access, there were 
important safety considerations for the fieldworkers. ‘Working the streets’ in well-
known paramilitary enclaves without their knowledge would be to invite trouble. 
Their ‘approval’ was secured by contacts with key political representatives in both 
communities, ostensibly to ‘keep them informed’ of our work, in reality it amounted 
to securing their unofficial endorsement. As Lee (1995) notes paramilitary groups in 
Northern Ireland satisfy themselves that researchers working in ‘their’ areas have no 
involvement with security forces. 
The second useful tactic in establishing our bona fides was to stress the independence 
of the research. One important aspect of this was the source of funding for the 
research. Those approached for interview would frequently enquire, or indeed we 
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would volunteer the information in an effort to stress our own independence, about 
the research sponsors. Although the project sought government (Northern Ireland 
Office) funding and did not secure it, this actually proved to be an advantage for 
fieldworkers. As the government is perceived by some of our interviewees to be a key 
protagonist in the conflict, to have secured funding from this source would have been 
tantamount to ‘supping with the devil’ and our motives would have been questioned. 
The fact the research was funded by an academic source (the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC)) and located within a university, in itself, suggested an 
independence which might otherwise have been difficult to secure. 
The third tactic was a methodological one. Part of the process of building street 
credibility and establishing the bona fides of the researchers comes through research 
leads. Gaining access to key interviewees and using ‘snowballing’ to extend the 
network can, not only improve the source of informants, but also reflect positively on 
the credibility of the researchers. In other words, if interviews have been secured with 
influential stakeholders, this has a reinforcing effect on the ‘weight’ of the research 
and, vicariously, those involved in undertaking it. The process extends to building 
relationships with key informants over a period of time and allowing rapport to be 
established incrementally, an experience similar to Brewer’s research in gaining the 
confidence of RUC interviewees suspicious of his motives (Brewer, 1993). 
Whilst seeking to convince the research constituency of our independence, the aims of 
the study include a statement that ‘the project is committed to non-violent alternatives 
to personal assaults, threats and shootings’. Undertaking qualitative research required 
interviews with informants who may personally and/or through the organisations they 
represent condone, actively support or have engaged in political violence in the past - 
a number of ex-prisoners (some convicted of murder(s)), for example, are now 
involved in community restorative justice projects. Interviewers cannot be seen to 
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identify with actions of paramilitaries in a disingenuous tactic to secure their co-
operation. It would be easy to feign empathy with their suggestions of bravery, 
protectiveness, toughness, fighting for the cause of the under-dog in an unjust ‘war’ - 
over-identification with subjects (Fielding, 1990). Conversely, researchers must guard 
against expressing repugnance of interviewees whose behaviour/actions they find 
anathema - this is unlikely to secure their co-operation in data gathering. Lee contends 
that in undertaking research on violent social conflict: 
 Complete neutrality is probably impossible. It is unlikely that one’s 
sympathies will be engaged to an equal degree by all parties to the 
conflict...Often when researchers proclaim their neutrality, they are in fact 
concealing their own sympathies. By doing so, they deceive at least some of 
those in the setting. A number of writers have argued that deception of this 
kind is permissible, indeed laudable, in highly stratified, repressive, or unequal 
contexts (Lee, 1995: 23). 
There is nothing new in conducting interviews with respondents whose views 
researchers disagree with, what is important in this research is the fact that remaining 
non-judgmental can be much more difficult to achieve and the independence of the 
researcher is frequently challenged. 
 
Openness and transparency 
When researching paramilitary violence there is a need for openness and transparency 
in dealings with individuals and groups who have been (and continue to be) in conflict 
with, and retain a measure of distrust towards, each other. This must be balanced 
against the requirement to maintain confidentiality. There is a fine line between these 
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requisites in this type of research and not everyone agrees that they are requisites. 
Tunnell, for example, argued in his research on violent crime in America that he was 
prepared to lie to ‘minimize risks to research participants, to myself and to the success 
of the research’ and ‘to deceive others who attempted to exercise their power over the 
research and participants’ (Tunnell, 1998: 209 & 213). He claimed that the nature of 
such research demanded this. ‘The methodologies of “muddy boots” and “grubby 
hands” implicitly means taking sides, recognizing the politics of one’s research, 
engaging in impression management, and hedging the truth’ (Tunnell, 1998: 208). 
Our own commitment to openness and transparency has been shaped where necessary 
by discretion and the need to maintain a low-profile. 
One approach which has proved useful in establishing transparency in this project is 
an informational leaflet containing details of the project (aims, objectives, 
methodology etc.). which is sent to participants in advance of an interview. This will 
often form the opening gambit for the face-to-face meeting and allows the researchers 
the opportunity to expand on the substance of the project, and the interviewee to 
follow-up with questions about the research. The facts contained therein are 
sufficiently broad to assure interviewees that the research is cross-community with 
clear public policy outcomes. 
The aim of maintaining openness and transparency did not, however, extend to 
actively publicising the research. The topic paramilitary ‘punishment’ beatings has a 
certain journalistic appeal. The widest read Belfast-based newspaper (The Belfast 
Telegraph), for example, ran a feature entitled 'Halt the Torture' which gave personal 
accounts of those who have been attacked. Whilst the intentions of the journalists 
were undoubtedly to heighten public awareness of the issue and perhaps bring 
pressure to bear on the paramilitaries, we avoided making any contribution to the 
public debate. Any such commentary could have been construed by potential 
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interviewees as taking a position on the issue which would have proved 
counterproductive in conducting further fieldwork. Moreover, ‘solutions’ were being 
sought by journalists to address this ‘problem’. Apart from the research being 
incomplete at that stage, explaining the nuances of the informal criminal justice 
system did not make for succinct journalistic sound-bites. Openness and transparency 
were therefore managed in a way which was not damaging to the aims and objectives 
of the project. 
This measured degree of openness still left the project vulnerable to seemingly 
innocuous requests for information from sources which could be seen by some of our 
informants as tendentious. The Northern Ireland Office, for example, invited us ‘to 
share perceptions of the problem’ with their senior civil servants. The invitation was 
treated with some cynicism as it coincided precisely with the politicisation of the issue 
when ‘punishment’ beatings threatened to stymie the implementation of the Belfast 
Agreement, prisoner releases in particular. As researchers, having access to 
interviewees in both the Northern Ireland Office and the RUC is a crucial part of the 
fieldwork and indeed we will rely on these public bodies for endorsement and/or 
implementation of any public policy recommendations emerging from the research. 
This, in turn, might create an expectation amongst these interviewees that we should 
share sensitive data gathered from other sources. To cross this line from researcher to 
informant, however, posed a dilemma. As researchers we did not wish to act in bad 
faith - on the one hand keen to secure interviews with senior civil servants and police 
officers but, on the other, unwilling to divulge information on the progress of the 
research. 
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Nomenclature 
A key issue in researching paramilitary violence is the political connotations of the 
language used by the researchers. This has wide-ranging implications ranging from, 
gaining access to targeted interviewees, through subsequent conduct of the fieldwork, 
to the publication and dissemination of the findings. So emotive is the use of language 
that key words can potentially restrict access or give the impression during fieldwork 
of bias on the part of the investigator. The nomenclature of the researcher is replete 
with politically sensitive words.  The most common pitfall is making reference to 
‘Northern Ireland’. Northern Ireland is the name of the formal political unit created by 
the Government of Ireland Act (1920), and Ulster or ‘historic Ulster’ is the province 
made up of nine counties of pre-1920 Ireland. With clear political overtures, 
nationalists use the term the ‘Six Counties’ or the ‘North of Ireland’ and unionists 
prefer the term ‘Ulster’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995: 509 - glossary and 
terminology). Even the seemingly unproblematic use of labels such as ‘unionist’ and 
‘nationalist’ is not always clear-cut (Whyte, 1990: 18). There is a distinction between 
those who see their loyalty primarily to Ulster and those whose allegiance is to the 
United Kingdom as a whole - the broad difference between ‘loyalists’ and ‘unionists’. 
Similarly, those who seek a united Ireland by constitutional consent would describe 
themselves as ‘nationalists’ compared with ‘republicans’ who defend the use of force 
to achieve the same objective. From this minefield of politically sensitive terms 
emerges a host of derivatives. Nationalists and unionists refer to the second city of 
Northern Ireland as Derry and Londonderry respectively. The combined term 'Sinn 
Féin/IRA' is now part of unionist political parlance to emphasise what they see as the 
inextricable link. The use of the Irish language is not uncommon in oral preliminary 
welcomes at interviews or written communications with nationalists or, more 
commonly, republicans. 
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The key question for those researching a topic with such obvious political sensitivities 
as paramilitary violence is whether to adopt the language known to be most 
acceptable to the interviewee. In order words, should the researcher adapt to different 
political settings in the absence of a neutral language? This question is particularly 
pertinent for local researchers who would be expected to understand the nuances of 
language and reflect this in their research questions. Outsiders are given some 
latitude. Our experience of research in other conflict countries such as Israel in which 
we referred to the site in East Jerusalem where Israeli are building homes on contested 
land as Har Homa (Hebrew) as opposed to Jabal Abu Ghneim (Arabic) brought swift 
but polite correction from Palestinian interviewees. Indigenous researchers would, we 
suspect, have been given short shrift. 
Aside from the use of general political labels, this particular research project 
generated its own difficulties with research language. In studying paramilitary 
violence a convenient and pragmatic short-hand was the use of the terms 
‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’. Put simply, paramilitaries carried out punishment 
beatings and those at the receiving end were victims. Therein lies a number of 
problems. The use of the term ‘punishment’, as Kennedy (1995) suggests, is value-
laden in that it carries a presumption that the victim is somehow deserving of what is 
meted out by the paramilitaries. Moreover, it can conjure up an image of 
chastisement, threatening behaviour and minor physical violence. This point is taken 
up in a parliamentary debate on the issue: 
 The term ‘punishment beating’ sounds like a modest extension of 
neighbourhood watch - at the very worst some vigilante group modestly 
beating up drug dealers or vandals. Let us make it absolutely clear what is 
going on in Northern Ireland. We are talking of mutilation, and of beatings in 
which every bone in the victim’s body is deliberately broken. It is intimidation 
  
 
19 
of the very worst sort, and often leads to exile (Andrew MacKay, Conservative 
Opposition Spokesperson on Northern Ireland: Parliamentary Debate - House 
of Commons 27 January 1999). 
In a similar vein the use of the term ‘victim’ can disempower those who have been the 
subject of such attacks and beatings. There is what Beattie and Doherty (1995) 
describe in their accounts of paramilitary-related violence, as the ‘subtle negotiation 
of blame’ away from the perpetrator to the victim. In a television interview by the 
hospital bedside of a 13 year old boy beaten by the paramilitaries, for example, his 
mother stated while he might be 'bad' like any other local young person, 'other kids do 
it and they don't get batons taken to them'.  
Such attacks do not recognise due process and summary justice carried out in this 
way, based upon accusation and hearsay has led to notable ‘mistakes’. John Brown, 
an 80 year old Belfast senior citizen, was shot in the knees and ankles by a Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) team who mistakenly identified him as a convicted 
paedophile. They subsequently apologised for their actions. In Strabane a masked 
squad of paramilitaries burst into a man’s house and beat him with baseball bats and 
an iron bar before realising their intended target lived next door. They regrouped and 
inflicted multiple injuries on his neighbour. 
The term ‘victim’ has also become politicised. A row broke out when the Minister for 
Victims in Northern Ireland met with families of PIRA members shot dead in 1987 by 
the SAS (Special Air Service) at Loughgall. The pressure group, Families Acting for 
Innocent Relatives (FAIR), claimed ‘these people were not victims - they caused the 
troubles’ (Thornton, 1999:6). Sinn Féin refuted this and argued no section had a 
monopoly on suffering and the grief of all relatives (terrorists or their victims) was 
indistinguishable. The incident exemplified the contested notion of what the Ulster 
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Unionist Party described as ‘genuine victims of terrorism’. A further question for the 
researchers was whether the short hand everyday usage of these terms, which has a 
practical convenience and is easily comprehended in fieldwork, compounds their 
inherent ambiguity, disempowers survivors and reinforces politicisation.  
 
Personal security 
The personal security risks associated with this type of research are high. Lee (1993), 
referring to Yancey and Rainwater (1970), described two kinds of danger that may 
arise during the research process: the ‘presentational’ and the ‘anonymous’. The 
former arises when the researcher’s presence or actions evoke aggression, hostility or 
violence within the setting. The latter, when the researcher is exposed to otherwise 
avoidable danger simply because of the dangerous research environment. Both kinds 
of dangers apply to studying paramilitary violence. Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland 
are well practised in dealing with ‘touts’ or those passing information, alleged or 
otherwise, to the RUC. This extends to those ‘speaking out’ against them. Suspected 
informers are shot, there are no exemption clauses for academic researchers. Former 
member of the PIRA Eamon Collins was murdered in January 1999 following his 
evidence against former PIRA colleagues in court, a book revealing their operations 
and depiction of its members as ‘a sadistic conspiracy of ageing, pot-bellied drink-
induced egos’. Vincent McKenna former member of the PIRA, spokesperson for the 
pressure group Human Rights Bureau and arch critic of paramilitary ‘punishment’ 
beatings, claims that the PIRA is waging a campaign of intimidation against him, 
including two bomb attacks at his home and the vilification of his character by 
accusations of child sex abuse. Of more direct relevance to this research was the 
attempted assassination of Queen’s University Professor of Comparative Politics, 
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Adrian Guelke, in September 1991. The Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) broke into his 
home in Belfast shot him in the side but failed to kill him because their guns jammed. 
The terrorists claimed that he was an intelligence officer for the IRA and involved in 
importing arms from the Middle East. It subsequently transpired from a journalist’s 
investigation that Professor Guelke’s South African background and research on 
violence therein had led to loyalist paramilitaries being approached. He was, he 
suspects, set up by an outsider. Guelke explained: 
 How or why I fell foul of some person in South Africa to the extent that I 
became a target for assassination I do not know. Perhaps my writing about 
South Africa’s supply of arms to Loyalist paramilitary organisations gave 
offence, or a brief investigation I carried out into extreme right-wing violence 
in South Africa may have been the cause. There were a number of 
possibilities. From my experience of Northern Ireland I know how utterly 
trivial the reasons someone becomes a target can be. In general, campaigns of 
violence are rarely conducted with precision, whatever their ultimate purpose 
(Guelke, 1998: 196). 
Guelke’s first hand experience provides an ominous warning against complacency in 
undertaking fieldwork into paramilitary violence. A surveillance network operates 
tasked with ‘keeping their eyes open’ for unusual activity on behalf of the 
paramilitaries. Suspicion of the researchers’ motives may not arise solely from 
paramilitaries. The security forces may have concerns about researchers being 
paramilitary ‘lilywhites’, spies with no known connection to paramilitaries. 
Suspicion of ‘outsiders’ is intense in this type of research and the perceived religion 
of the researcher is likely to be a key factor in the minds of interviewees. They will 
look for ‘clues’ to religious affiliation which has become intrinsic to social interaction 
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in Northern Ireland. The most obvious, although not fail-safe, is the researcher’s 
name. Beyond that, area of residence, birthplace, accent/language, appearance, school 
attended, interest in particular sports and, somewhat bizarrely, whether one is 
‘Catholic or Protestant-looking’ (Burton, 1978). Coming from the ‘other’ community 
may condition the response of interviewees or put the researcher at some risk given 
the sensitive topic under review and the nature of the questions posed. To understand 
paramilitary ‘policing’ in Northern Ireland requires probing questions about motives, 
methods, support for paramilitaries’ actions within their communities, and the 
exploration of alternative ways of dealing with anti-social behaviour. To the 
suspicious interviewee this may smack of information gathering reinforced by our 
preference to tape-record the interview for the purposes of data analysis. 
It is only sensible in undertaking fieldwork to observe cautious security protocol.  
Being aware of the constituency in which one is interviewing is crucial - staunchly 
loyalist and republican enclaves are dotted throughout most towns/cities in Northern 
Ireland. Sensible security planning can involve working out entry and exit routes, 
opting, where possible, for safe(ish) locations to conduct interviews (e.g. 
administrative headquarters of political parties linked to paramilitaries), taking taxis to 
venues as opposed to using personal transport with car registration details, doing 
fieldwork in pairs, informing other members of the research team of your schedule.  
Whilst highlighting the importance of sensible personal security measures, these must 
be kept in perspective. Here we concur with Punch (1989), that researchers of 
controversial topics must not ‘become over-sensitive so as to avoid dubbing the 
setting or topic virtually unresearchable’ (cited in Brewer, 1993: 142). 
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Conclusion 
Our experience gained in researching paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland 
demonstrates a need for measured sensitivity. The dearth of empirical work, which 
explores the complexities of the community-paramilitary relationship, makes this a 
worthwhile research topic. The concomitant methodological difficulties have no doubt 
contributed to the paucity of literature which, in itself, makes the study even more 
interesting. Difficult-to-access subjects present new challenges for social scientists 
which may be situation-specific. Measured sensitivity, however, requires an 
awareness of the inherent dangers, whilst at the same time a flexibility in approach to 
problems which present themselves in the field. Managing issues of disclosure, 
sensitivity of language and perceived identification with all parties are crucial to such 
research. To ignore the obvious dangers would not only place the researcher at risk 
but would also be unlikely to secure the data necessary to investigate the phenomenon 
under study. What is clear from our work is that the pace of the research is less easy to 
dictate. Access can prove to be both time-consuming and restricted. Researching those 
subject to paramilitary 'punishment' to understand better the nature of such violence is 
difficult. There are relatively few gatekeepers and their priorities rarely coincide with 
the aims of the research. This may lead to compromise on research design. A quota 
sampling framework of interviewees, for example, is an unrealistic goal when access 
is so tightly controlled. Building trust with gatekeepers is crucially important to 
gaining access. This takes time. Thereafter researchers must demonstrate their 
independence in dealing with interviewees whose sensitivities are acute and where the 
researchers' motives are constantly under scrutiny. 
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